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Abstract 
This paper decomposes manufacturing import growth rates in 5 large industrial and 8 large developing 
countries and measures the relative contributions of domestic demand and market share changes for 
1986/87, 1991/92, 1996/97, 2001/02, 2006/07 and 2011/12. Imports as a share of domestic value 
added has increased significantly over this period and account between 70 to 80 percent of import 
growth during this period. Exports from developing countries and especially China account for the 
bulk of this increase. China is an exception to this development and its import shares have not 
increased and have actually decreased during the last period. Finally future trade growth rates are 
going to decrease. Most of the early growth of trade was caused by trade liberalizations from almost 
closed economies and initial market shares were very low so that any change led to high trade growth 
rates. Now that the market shares are already very high, it is almost impossible to replicate similar 
growth rates.  
Keywords 
Global manufacturing, developing countries market shares, manufacturing value added, patterns of 
trade 
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Introduction* 
Aksoy and Ng (2013a, 2013b), decompose import growth rates for a set of large industrial and 
developing countries (five industrial and eight developing) and measure relative contributions of 
domestic demand and market share changes over the period 1986/87, 1991/92, 1996/97, 2001/02, 
2006/07 and 2011/12 (using 2-year averages to minimize the annual fluctuations in trade and output). 
The five industrial countries were Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and the USA; the eight large 
developing countries were Brazil, Korea Rep., Malaysia, India, Mexico, South Africa, Turkey and 
China. The market share measure used was the share of manufacturing imports in gross manufacturing 
production expressed in current US dollars. Data used for domestic production was gross 
manufacturing output from UNIDO sources. Gross output was used for consistency with the trade data 
obtained from the UN COMTRADE Statistics database. 
The two studies showed that: (a) all the economies in question had very significant import 
penetration caused by trade liberalizations that contributed to high trade growth rates; (b) there had 
been significant increases in the market shares of developing countries in these large industrial and 
developing countries, but close to 80 percent of the developing country market share gains were due to 
China alone.  
Comments on these papers focused on a few areas. A first comment concerned the use of gross 
production data for domestic output. Some suggested that manufacturing value added would be a 
better indicator to estimate import shares. It was pointed out that imports as a share of GDP (value 
added) are more commonly used as the measure of import penetration than gross output. On the same 
issue others argued that UNIDO manufacturing value added data was quite different than other sources 
(WDI, IMF and other UN sources) and that the UNIDO gross output numbers could not easily be 
verified against other sources. Other common data sources do not report gross manufacturing output, 
so that using UNIDO gross production numbers could bias our analysis. Finally, many questioned 
whether the trends documented in the papers changed after the recession of 2008.  
This paper tries to answer these questions and respond to the comments. We re-estimate 
manufacturing market shares using value added, defining market shares as imports of manufactured 
products divided by domestic manufacturing value added. For value added, World Bank WDI data are 
used as these are very close to other official and UN figures and are adjusted for exchange rate 
fluctuations. To place trade developments in a longer and more consistent framework, we added 
additional years and generated six observations for equal 5-year intervals. Our new periods of two year 
averages are 1986/87, 1991/92, 1996/97, 2001/02, 2006/07 and 2011/12. These years partially overlap 
with years used in the earlier work. These years also allow us to assess the performance of trade in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, when the developing countries were liberalizing their trade regimes; the 
impact of the recession during 2001/02; the 2000s when world demand was growing very rapidly; and 
the post 2007 period when the world economy entered a serious recession. Because China has such a 
large impact on world manufacturing; we separate China from other developing countries.  
While the results are not exactly comparable to our earlier findings – both due to changing the 
denominator from gross output to value added and changing the period analyzed – they are broadly 
similar to our earlier findings. 
 Manufacturing imports as a share of domestic manufacturing value added in the 13 countries 
increased dramatically from 31.8 percent in 1986/87 to 71.5 percent in 2011/12. If China is 
excluded, the import share in the remaining sample increased from 31.8 percent to 85.1 percent 
at the end of the period. For industrial countries this ratio increased from 32.7 percent in 1986/87 
                                                     
*
 Authors are former staff members of the World Bank. We are grateful to Yilmaz Akyuz, John Baffes and Tanju 
Yurukoglu for useful comments and suggestions. Emails: Ataman.Aksoy@gmail.com; Francis.ng2013@gmail.com. 
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to 83.8 percent in 2011/12. For developing countries, the growth is even more dramatic, with 
import shares increasing from 25.7 percent to 89.1 percent in 2011/12. The increases are similar 
in size to our earlier findings and are primarily driven by trade liberalization.  
 Most of the rapid trade growth observed over this period reflects market share increases and not 
so much growth of output. Between 70 to 80 percent of import growth is caused by market share 
changes.  
 For the industrial countries, 70 percent of market share increases are due to developing countries, 
of which half is due to China alone. After 2001, the developing countries’ contribution increases 
to 85 percent, with China accounting for 65 percent of the increase.  
 For the developing countries, market share increases are driven by China and other developing 
countries. For the period as a whole developing countries account for over 60 percent of market 
share changes, with China accounting for 50 percent of this change. After 2001, China’s 
contribution increases to 80 percent, and that of industrial countries decreases. China is far more 
important for the developing countries.  
 China is an exception to other large developing and industrial countries in that its import shares 
have not increased at the same rates as the others. In the post 2008 period, China has become 
more autarchic – its share of imports from other countries has actually decreased as a share of its 
manufacturing value added.  
 Since market shares have increased from about 20-30 percent to around 90 percent, maintaining 
similar growth rates would require larger and larger absolute market share increases. Since this is 
not possible, growth rates will be declining independent of any structural change.  
Data  
For this study manufacturing value added data is from WDI of World Bank in current US dollars 
adjusted for real exchange rate changes against the US dollar
1
. These series are consistent with trade 
data from the UN COMTRADE database which is also denominated in current US dollars. The 
definition of industrial countries is based on the traditional IMF definition that includes the EU15, 
United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland. Developing 
countries include all countries in the world except the 23 industrial ones. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
developing countries are Mexico for US and Canada, and Eastern European countries and Turkey for 
France and Germany. The 1986/87, 1991/92, 1996/97, 2001/02, 2006/07 and 2011/12 periods are used 
as benchmarks to estimate growth rates and import shares. Two year averages are used to minimize 
the annual fluctuations in output and trade. Although the periods are of same length, we have 
presented the trade growth rates as annual rates.  
Import growth in these countries is decomposed into changes due to demand increases and changes 
due to market share changes. . Demand growth is the annual rate of growth of domestic manufacturing 
value added in current US dollars adjusted for real exchange rate changes. The contribution of demand 
changes is estimated assuming a constant share of imports in value added between the two time 
periods, i.e. the market shares do not change. Market share changes are then estimated as the 
difference between the actual import growth rate and the import growth rate under a constant market 
share assumption.  
                                                     
1
 Value added data is converted from local currency into US dollars at the existing rate of exchange. Swings in exchange 
rates lead to large changes in the US dollar value of local production independent of real changes. To minimize this effect, 
we adjust the valuation of local value added for real exchange rate changes.  
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Analysis  
The global picture 
In Figure 1, we present the import growth rates for the sample countries separated into demand (output) 
and market share changes. Given the large impact of China, especially in the later periods, we separate 
the sample into with and without China. 
 
 
An important determinant of the growth of trade is the growth of output. The second component is the 
market share increases. When imports take a larger share of domestic market, trade expands at faster 
rates. This is driven by the significant trade liberalizations that have taken place and this is the 
component that trade analysts focus on. For this reason we present both the output and market share 
increases separately to show the effects of both on import growth rates.  
Total import growth for these countries was high during 1986/87-1991/92 and 1991/92-1996/97 
periods; 11.4 and 8.9 per annum for countries with China and 11.3 and 8.7 percent p.a. for the 
countries without China. During 1996/97- 2001/02, import growth slows down to 4.8 and 4.2 percent 
p.a. respectively. Since there is almost no value added growth during this period, import growth is 
solely driven by market share changes. There is a rebound during 2001/02- 2006/07 period to 12.3 and 
11.9 percent p.a. respectively. This is partially due to an output rebound from the recession of the 
earlier period. Finally, after the recession of 2008, 2006/07-2011/12, trade growth slows dramatically 
to 5.4 percent p.a. for countries with China and 4.5 percent p.a. for countries without China. Figure 1 
also shows the impact of China on global manufacturing trade. Its impact increases over time and it is 
different than the rest of the sample. It has higher output growth and lower market share increases than 
other countries in the sample.  
Figure 2 shows the share of imports in adjusted value added over this period. It clearly 
demonstrates the very large increases in market shares globally. This is driven by significant trade 
liberalizations in almost all countries along with the increasing competitiveness of most countries, 
especially the developing ones (Akyuz 2011, 2012: Athukorola 2011). Development of product chains 
driven by large multinational companies have also contributed (Hoekman 2015). Import shares have 
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Figure 1. Global Manufacturing Import Growth,  
with and without China (percent p.a)  
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increased from about 32 percent at the beginning of the period to 85 percent for the sample without 
China and 72 percent with China by the end of the period. This corresponds to an almost threefold 
increase in 25 years.  
 
 
Disaggregated Analysis  
Industrial and developing countries’ trade growth might have evolved differently. Therefore in the 
next section we analyze two groups of countries separately. The data suggests that trade growth cycles 
are very similar in both groups of countries while the actual growth rates differ. We also exclude 
China from these two subgroups and treat it as a third group.  
Figures 3 and 4 show the annualized growth rate of shares of imports for 5 industrial and 7 
developing countries. There are 3 periods of high import (trade) growth and 2 periods of relatively low 
growth.  
Industrial Countries: Output (value added) growth has slowly decelerated from late 1980s to 2001, 
where it turns negative for 1997-2002 period. There is an improvement to more than 5 percent p.a. 
during the 2001/02 -2006/07. During the recession period of 2006/07-2011/02, output growth rates 
decelerate to 1.5 percent p.a.  
31.8 
38.8 
49.5 
60.5 
71.6 71.5 
31.8 
39.0 
51.6 
63.3 
77.7 
85.1 
1986/87 1991/92 1996/97 2001/02 2006/07 2011/12
Figure 2. Global Manufacturing Import Shares  
(average in percent)  
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Growth rates of manufacturing sector value added during 2008 crisis are not much lower than the 
growth rates than during the early 1990s and much higher than late 1990s (1996/07- 2001/02). This is 
because during the late 1990s, France, Germany, and Japan all had negative growth rates. During the 
post 2008 period, only France has negative value added growth, while the other four countries have 
positive but low growth.  
What differentiates the last period is the very slow growth of market share increases. Part of this 
can be explained by the lower import shares in the early periods. As the shares increase, we do expect 
a decline in growth rates. This is a point we will return in the last section.  
Developing Countries: Annual output growth rates are much higher in the 7 developing countries 
but the pattern of growth in the 5 industrial countries and 7 developing countries are very similar. 
Output growth rates decelerate during the first three periods with an uptick during the early 2000s. It is 
interesting that output growth rates are higher during the last recession (2006/07-2011/12) than output 
growth rates during mid 1990s (1996/97-2001/02). Earlier period has a more significant recession, 
affecting both the industrial and developing countries. Even with the serious last recession, and with 
reasonably high imports shares, the import share increases are still 1.7 percent p.a.  
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Figure 3. Import Growth in 5 industrial Countries  
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It is obvious that trade liberalizations undertaken during the late 1980s and early 1990s were the main 
determinants of import share increases. That is why we see huge increases in market share changes 
during the first two periods. A related question is the acceleration of growth during the 2001-2006 
period. While there are many causes for this acceleration, part of the reason might be a rebound from 
lower growth a period earlier.  
Market Shares: Major driving force for the trade growth has been the increases in market shares 
and not so much output increases. This is especially true for the 5 industrial countries where the 
contributions of market share changes are much greater than the increases in value added. Annual 
growth rate of total imports of the 5 industrial countries for the whole period are 7.2 percent p.a., while 
the growth rate of output was only 3.2 percent p.a. For the 7 developing countries, the same rates are 
11.7 versus 7.3 percent p.a. If the trade growth had grown at the same rate as output, that means there 
had been no market share change, the resulting import values would be only 20 percent of what 
actually in 2011/12, and for the developing countries imports would be 30 percent of the actual value. 
In other words, between 70 to 80 percent of import growth are caused by market share changes. So 
the biggest driver of trade growth over the last few decades has been caused by import liberalizations 
and increases in competitiveness.  
For developing countries, import share increases are far larger during late 1980s and early 1990s 
when most of these countries were undertaking trade reforms. It is clear that the reforms have not 
continued at the same rate or by that time most of the trade regime had been liberalized. Another 
development is the pattern of integration of some of the developing countries into the world economy. 
Countries such as Malaysia, Mexico, and to a lesser extent China and Korea, have started as export 
platforms where they import most of the parts/components and assemble them for export. So initially 
their import to value added ratios shoot up. Over time many of the parts/components start being 
produced domestically so the import penetration ratios decline or at least import share growth slows 
down (IMF 2011; UNCTAD 2012; WB various issues). This explains part of the slowdown in the 
increase in import shares for the developing countries.  
To illustrate how the market shares have changed and which groups of countries are responsible for 
the changes, we have separated them into 5 groups for industrial countries and 4 groups for developing 
countries. For industrial countries we have China as a separate group along with Free Trade 
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Agreements (FTA) countries, and all other countries. FTA countries are EU for France and Germany 
and NAFTA for US and Canada. We break these further into FTA among industrial countries, which 
are the imports from original EU 15 countries for France and Germany and imports from each other 
for US and Canada. FTA imports from developing countries are imports from Mexico for US and 
Canada and other EU 12 members and Turkey for France and Germany. All other imports are also 
separated into imports from other developing and industrial countries.  
Table 1: Global Manufacturing Import Shares (percent of domestic adjusted value added) 
         Share of Imports in manufacturing value added (%) 
Country Group 1986/87 1991/92 1996/97 2001/02 2006/07 2011/12 
Industrial Countries (5):             
Global Imports 32.7 38.2 48.8 62.0 76.6 83.8 
From China  0.5 1.6 3.6 6.8 14.0 18.7 
From FTAs 14.1 17.1 20.5 25.5 29.9 31.0 
    Industrial countries 13.3 15.8 17.3 19.8 23.0 22.3 
    Developing countries  0.8 1.2 3.2 5.7 6.9 8.7 
All other countries  18.2 19.5 24.7 29.7 32.6 34.1 
    Industrial Countries  13.4 13.5 16.1 18.8 19.9 19.9 
    Developing Countries  4.8 6.0 8.6 10.8 12.7 14.2 
              
Developing Countries (7) :             
Global Imports 25.7 44.9 67.7 70.1 82.4 89.1 
From China  0.1 0.8 2.3 4.5 13.6 19.7 
From FTAs - Industrial Co. 4.0 9.0 16.7 20.6 16.4 14.2 
All other countries  21.5 35.1 48.7 45.1 52.3 55.1 
    Industrial Countries  18.6 28.4 37.3 31.8 33.6 32.6 
    Developing Countries  2.9 6.7 11.4 13.3 18.7 22.5 
Sources: Computations are based on WDI and COMTRADE databases. 
One of the reasons for this classification is to account certain discrete events that make a large 
difference in changing market shares. One important event is the inclusion of some developing 
countries into regional trade arrangements. In our sample of countries, imports from Mexico for US 
and Canada, caused primarily by NAFTA, make a big difference in their import growth rates after 
1994. Similarly, expansion of EU to Eastern Europe and Turkey during the 1990s also leads to a spurt 
in imports from these countries which are classified as developing countries. We observe these one-off 
gains in the import shares of Germany and France. Import shares by FTA countries (Mexico for US 
and Canada, and Eastern Europe and Turkey for France and Germany) almost double between 
1996/97 and 2001/02 (Table 1). Second important development is China joining the WTO which 
increases the imports from China at much faster rates. Since China joined the WTO in 2001, its shares 
in these markets have more than doubled.  
Table 1 shows the global manufacturing import shares in 5 industrial and 7 developing countries. 
This table highlights few points. First, all groups of countries have increased their shares in these 
markets suggesting greater integration of these economies. Second, developing countries which were 
much more closed at the beginning of the period are now much more open. Third, despite the serious 
recession, import shares continue to increase. And finally, the slowdown in import shares is more 
prominent among imports from industrial countries than from developing ones. For the developing 
M. Ataman Aksoy and Francis Ng 
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countries, share of imports from industrial countries have actually decreased and they have either 
decreased or not increased for industrial countries. All groups of developing countries have continued 
to increase their market shares despite the recession. 
Another way of looking at this phenomenon is to estimate the contribution of each subgroup to 
market share changes (Table 2). This can be done by estimating the percentage contribution of each 
group of countries to market share increases. 
 
Table 2: Contribution of Market Shares in Manufacturing Imports  
 
 
 
     
 
     Contribution of each group (%)    
Country Group 
1986/87-
1991/92 
1991/92-
1996/97 
1996/97-
2001/02 
2001/02-
2006/07 
 2006/07-
2011/12 
Industrial Countries (5):            
Global Imports 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 
From China  19.9 19.5 24.4 49.1  64.8 
From FTAs 55.5 32.0 37.9 30.6  15.0 
    Industrial countries 46.4 13.6 19.1 22.1  -10.0 
    Developing countries  9.0 18.4 18.8 8.5  25.0 
All other countries  24.7 48.5 37.7 20.3  20.3 
    Industrial Countries  1.2 24.8 20.5 7.5  -0.2 
    Developing Countries  23.5 23.7 17.3 12.8  20.5 
             
Developing Countries (7) :            
Global Imports 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 
From China  3.5 6.6 90.6 74.8  90.9 
From FTAs - Industrial Co. 26.0 33.8 160.8 -33.7  -33.3 
All other countries  70.5 59.6 -151.4 58.8  42.3 
    Industrial Countries  51.2 38.8 -231.7 14.7  -13.9 
    Developing Countries  19.3 20.8 80.3 44.1  56.3 
  
    
 
 
Sources: Computations are based on WDI and COMTRADE databases. 
Industrial countries: Here one can see the trends more clearly. Market share changes increase in post 
1990 period. As expected, the contribution of China increases from about 20 percent, to 65 percent in 
2011/12. Similarly developing countries within FTA arrangements increase their shares with the 
NAFTA and EU accession of Eastern Europe and Turkey. Industrial countries contribute less and 
actually lose market shares. One possible reason for this might be that the trade regimes among 
industrial countries were already quite liberal but the developing countries started their integration into 
the world economy during the late 1980s and 90s. 
The increase in import shares really start after 1991 and continue increasing until the recession of 
2008. Increases are driven initially by the FTA arrangements followed by the increase by China. For 
the period as a whole, 70 percent of the market share increases are contributed by developing countries 
and China accounts for half of this. Looking at the last decade, i.e. post 2001; developing countries 
account for 76 percent of the market share change but now China accounts for 72 percent of the 
developing country market share gains and 55 percent of all market share changes.  
Decomposing Growth in Manufacturing Trade 
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Developing Countries: Market share of imports are almost triple during this period. These 7 
countries are now more open than the industrial countries. But the biggest gains are in the late 1980s 
and 1990s when most of the major developing countries were undertaking trade reforms. There are 
also surges caused by trade arrangements. Imports from industrial FTA countries (by Turkey and 
Mexico) surge with NAFTA and EU accession. But this is just a substitution of imports from other 
industrial countries to EU and NAFTA countries. Of course the surges then slowly dissipate. But as a 
trend, the initial gains are made mostly by industrial countries and starting around 2001, developing 
countries make most of the gains, and even take market shares from industrial countries.  
For the period as a whole, China contributes about 31 percent of the gains, FTA countries 16 
percent and all other countries contribute 53 percent. Other developing countries contribute only 31 
percent and the rest is contributed by other industrial countries. China dominates the market share 
changes and explains close to 90 percent of the market share gains after 2001 (Hanson and Robertson 
2008).  
China 
Given the tremendous impact of China, we decided to look at it separately and not as a part of the 
large developing countries. Figure 5 shows the pattern and composition of import growth for China.  
 
 
First, unlike most of the other countries, the contribution of market share changes is not the main 
driver of import growth in China. The main driver of import growth is the very fast rate of growth of 
value added. For comparison, the average growth rate of value added is around 6 percent p.a. for the 7 
developing countries but it is 14 percent p.a. for China. The other countries with sizable manufacturing 
sectors and have high value added growth are Korea and India which only grew at 10 percent p.a.  
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Figure 5. China's Import Growth  
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As of 2011/12, among the 13 countries in our sample, China has the second lowest share of imports at 
39 percent (Figure 6). The only other country that has a lower import share is Japan at 36 percent. 
Furthermore, most other countries had continuously increasing import shares, while China had two 
periods where import shares actually declined and from a relatively low base. Even Japan which 
started with very low import shares shows continuously increasing import shares. To illustrate the 
differences, Figure 7 shows the import shares of 4 major countries with large and advanced 
manufacturing sectors.  
 
 
Other countries with major manufacturing sectors all show significant increases in integration with the 
rest of the world. Their import shares have increased two to threefold over this period while there is 
little increase in China’s import share. Rapid increase in import shares after 1996 is reversed after 
2006 and by the end period import shares are both low and similar to where they were in 1986.  
Trade Growth Deceleration  
One of the important debates about trade growth has been its deceleration, especially after the 2008 
recession (Constantinescu, Mattoo and Ruta, 2014 and 2015; Hoekman 20015). Our data also indicates 
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a serious slowdown driven both by slow output growth and very little change in import shares. While 
we have another period of low growth during 1996/97- 2001/02 period, that was caused primarily by 
low output growth. During the post 2008 period the low trade growth is mostly caused by low rate of 
growth of market shares. The problem is a statistical one. As the market shares increase, a similar 
change in absolute market share change corresponds to a lower growth rate. Since market shares 
cannot increase forever, the growth rates start to decline, even if the absolute increases are similar.  
Figure 8 shows the relationship between the level and change in market shares. The data consists of 
65 observations one for each country and period. We tested for the following relationships. First we 
tested whether there are any correlations between value-added growth rates and market share changes. 
There is no correlation between them. So there is no spillover from output to imports. Then we tested 
whether the market share changes had declined in the last period as argued. There is no statistical 
difference between the last period and the other periods. Actually none of the periods have a 
statistically different market share change rate than other periods. And finally we tested the 
relationship between the level of market shares and their change. The levels of market shares are 
negatively correlated with market share change rates. As market shares increase, their growth rates 
decline. We show this relation in Figure 8 below.  
 
 
 
In the regression, we also observed that China was an outlier in this regression. We added a China 
dummy to the equation which was significantly negative (t-values in parentheses).  
 
Market share change rate = 19.99 - 3.85 log(marketshare) - 5.44 China   
             (5.9)   (-4.7)                   (-2.2)   
R2=0.28; n=65 
** China dummy is significant at 97 percent; the other two are significant at 99 percent.  
y = -0.0272x + 1.8581 
R² = 0.2223 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
-20 -10 0 10 20 30
lo
gM
ar
ke
t 
sh
ar
e
  
Market Share Change  
Figure 8. Market Share: Levels and Changes  
logmshare
Linear (logmshare )
M. Ataman Aksoy and Francis Ng 
12 
Since the market share growth rates are by definition negatively correlated with market shares and 
thus decrease over time, we looked at the absolute increases in market shares. Table 3 shows the 
absolute contribution of each subgroup to the overall change in market shares. For example, for 
industrial countries between 1986/87 and 1991/92, share of imports as a percentage of domestic value 
added increased from 32.7 percent to 38.2 percent (Table 1). So the total increase is 5.4 percentage 
points. This is the total change over the five years between the market shares in two periods. This 
percentage change increases to 7.2 percentage points in the last period. The 5.4 percentage point 
increase in import shares in the first period corresponds to an annual growth of 3.3 percent p.a. while 
7.2 percentage point increase during the last period only corresponds to a 1.8 percent increase p.a.  
 
Table 3: Composition of Market Share Changes in Manufacturing Imports  
 
          Absolute contribution over 5 years (%)   
Country Group 
1986/87-
1991/92 
1991/92-
1996/97 
1996/97-
2001/02 
2001/02-
2006/07 
2006/07-
2011/12 
Industrial Countries (5):           
Global Imports 5.4 10.7 13.1 14.6 7.2 
From China  1.1 2.1 3.2 7.2 4.7 
From FTAs 3.0 3.4 5.0 4.5 1.1 
    Industrial countries 2.5 1.4 2.5 3.2 -0.7 
    Developing countries  0.5 2.0 2.5 1.2 1.8 
All other countries  1.3 5.2 5.0 3.0 1.5 
    Industrial Countries  0.1 2.6 2.7 1.1 0.0 
    Developing Countries  1.3 2.5 2.3 1.9 1.5 
            
Developing Countries (7) :           
Global Imports 19.2 22.8 2.4 12.3 6.7 
From China  0.7 1.5 2.2 9.2 6.1 
From FTAs - Industrial Co. 5.0 7.7 3.8 -4.1 -2.2 
All other countries  13.6 13.6 -3.6 7.2 2.8 
    Industrial Countries  9.8 8.8 -5.5 1.8 -0.9 
    Developing Countries  3.7 4.7 1.9 5.4 3.8 
Sources: Computations are based on WDI and COMTRADE databases. 
These results corroborate our earlier findings. Decline in market share growth rates is primarily 
coming from imports of industrial countries. In terms of imports from developing countries, the 
decline is minimal.  
Table 3 also shows that during 1996/97- 2001/02 recession, industrial countries continued to have 
increases in import shares - mostly driven FTAs - while developing countries reacted by reducing 
import growth, that is almost no change in import shares.  
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Conclusion  
In this paper we focus on trends in world manufacturing trade over the last 25 years by analyzing the 
import patterns of 13 large industrial and developing countries that account for more than 50 percent 
of world manufacturing output and trade. Imports as a share of domestic value added has increased 
significantly over this period and accounts for 70 to 80 percent of import growth during this period. 
Exports from developing countries and especially China account for the bulk of this increase. China is 
an exception to this development in that its import shares have not increased – and actually decreased 
during the most recent period.  
Given that bulk of the rapid trade growth reflects market share changes, future trade growth rates 
are going to decrease significantly. Most of the early growth of trade was caused by trade 
liberalizations from almost closed economies. Initial market shares were very low so that any change 
led to high growth rates. Now that market shares are very high, it is almost impossible to have the 
same growth rates in the same path even if import shares increase at the same absolute level.  
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